Camelot is a Myth

Image of the death of King ArthurDon’t let it be forgot
That once there was a spot
For one brief shining moment
That was known as Camelot!”

In a response, the Unified Command ideal is the same as the Camelot ideal; heroes come together to save the kingdom, chivalry and courage reign, decisions are wise and actions are just.

No myth – Unified Command truly is the best solution to large, complex incidents. It brings the best of the best together, and places each resource in a command/control structure designed to accommodate any scale of response planning, actions and personnel. It is the most expandable command structure extant, the most efficient way to mobilize and manage response resources and the greatest hope for a response structure that fully utilizes every resource.

It is in short, ideal, and the ideal for response effectiveness.

But it is also a myth, an ever-elusive ideal. Response realities attack the ideal. As Unified Command forms and responds, the reality doesn’t always, or even usually, match the ideal of Unified Command. It’s not perfect. Nothing created by human beings can be. It is subject to failure and inefficiency. Reality often falls short of the ideal.

The response dynamic dozen

What are some of the dynamics that can create this gap between ideal and real?  There are many, each of which seasoned responders can recognize and react to. People who have served in a Unified Command response can share horror stories, including one or more of the following, a dynamic dozen of disfunction:

  • The habitual lair: The trap we all fall into when we bring old habits into a new structure. Our habits are our reality. Everybody does what she or he was doing yesterday, across Unified Command, not just the JIC. So our response decisions are often made based on yesterday’s realities, not todays. We end up making good decisions for the last event, not for this one.
  • Paralysis of analysis: There is never enough information. This symptom dramatically affects the Joint Information Center, particularly one afflicted with a slow approval process. In the quest for ‘just a bit more information’, response updates are delayed, revised, delayed and finally released too late. While we all accept the fact that ‘truth comes after the incident is over’, we still have a hard time deciding when we have enough information to share. So we delay our decisions until the information train has left the station. We can’t decide when enough information is enough.
  • Fog of war: Confusion in conflict. The fog of war isn’t just lack of clear information, it’s also lack of coordinated effort. In the early stages of a response everything is in flux. Not only do we not know many details of what happened, we don’t know who is doing what, or where. Rapid and large response actions always lead to confusion while all the moving parts settle into place. Facts are flexible, both in existence and in duration; hat is accurate right now may be completely wrong in a few minutes.
  • The devil we know: We all want to work with people we’re familiar with, regardless of their relative competency. This dynamic is remarkably common, for good reason; we’re all under stress, unconsciously reverting to our lizard brain. We can’t adapt to new things at this point, seeking instead the comfort of the familiar. This includes familiar people. So an Incident Commander makes ‘their’ PIO the response PIO, even if there are more qualified people in the room. APIOs place responders they know in key positions because they have worked with them before, not because they’re the best person.
  • The devil we don’t know: From the many, one. Assimilation of multiple persons from multiple organizations into a single response structure is a challenge. All of Unified Command is built to achieve this singular task, but it is still difficult. Even if we are able to overcome our lizard brain, we still have to assimilate; everything takes time, when we have so little time. We need to learn phone numbers, email addresses, names. We have to figure out how to share information, what level of expertise each person has. We have to learn how to talk to each other. We have to merge multiple personalities, practices and preferences into a cohesive team.
  • The Napoleon complex: Some people just love power. These are the seekers of authority. They live for it and will leap in to serve in positions that give them power over people. By the way, this is a stress reaction as well: If you deal with power needs every day, your needs will be supercharged under response stress. The problem with power seekers is that their ambition has little to do with their capability. They’re not good managers, nor are they necessarily good at what they do. So they become a ‘competency black hole’, having little competency themselves while also sucking other competency out of the room.
  • The Phantom: Other people disappear when they should take charge. These are the opposite of Napoleons. They are usually highly capable, with great experience and wisdom, but when they’re needed the most they retreat away from responsibility or the spotlight. They don’t offer their skills, counsel or support; they fade away.
  • The accidental tourist: Some people just don’t get it. They show up but don’t belt up. When the going gets tough, they get going, out the door. These are the people who arrive in the JIC, survey the scene, and figure out a way to disappear. They avoid positions of responsibility, never stepping up into leadership positions their skills and experience indicate. If pressed into a specific role, they delay, divert or disappear. These are the people who will send a text or email saying they’ve been called back to their own office because of an unspecified crisis. They want to be in the room, but they don’t want to actually do anything.
  • The Anchormen: People who promote themselves, but don’t add to the capability of the team. Unlike the Phantoms, these people seek out the limelight, not for power but for prestige. These are speech teachers who will give students’ speeches for them, out of the joy of hearing their own voice. They’re the camera hogs, typically really, really good in front of the camera or in front of the crowd. But they’re often unconsciously unqualified, depending on their looks and comfort instead of knowing the details and issues of the response. They’re caught in their own habitual lair, not recognizing that what worked for them in peacetime is not going to work for them today.
  • Nervous Nellies: These people are stressed, and they can’t get hold of themselves. So they stress everyone around them out. They are afraid. Fear in itself isn’t a bad thing when it focuses the mind on what is most important, but with nervous Nellies, fear fogs good judgement. In their fear, every challenge looms equally large, so they end up majoring in the minors, expending resources and energy on irrelevant issues. Where courage concentrates, fear fuddles.
  • Outside Experts: People noted for their knowledge, but whose knowledge doesn’t extend to this place, or this circumstance. These people know too much about the wrong thing; wrong circumstances, wrong impacts, wrong stakeholders. They end up hurting the response by weighing decisions with wrong information.
  • The fifth column: People interested only in their own reputations, at great expense to the response. They may show up, but the often fail to put up. At the end of the day they are going to protect themselves. A persistent hallmark of the fifth-column is an individual’s or Agency’s statement; ‘They decided on that action over my objections.’ Another hallmark is when a response partner keeps their own meeting space, refusing or resisting efforts at integration. This action is never taken for the good of the response, only for the good of the organization doing it.

Every communicator, every responder, has a list of this type. Any one of these dynamics impacts the effectiveness of Unified Command; how does it endure multiples? With so many impediments, how does Unified Command ever succeed?

Unified Command is a wonderful thing

First, the structure was built out of actual responses, and many of these dynamics reared their heads in those responses. Remember the adage; “If you want to know how to fight a fire, ask someone who smells like smoke.” Unified Command was invented by people who smelled like smoke – literally. The structure, policies and practices of Unified Command provide much of the solution. The experience and accumulated wisdom of past response veterans provides additional insight.

This is why Unified Command can be compared to the fictional Camelot. While not perfect, it is the closest we can get. There are solutions! Preparation is the process of identifying problems and planning procedures to prevent them, Future posts will outline some of the solutions to these dynamics.

But first, what other additions to the dynamic dozen do YOU have? Share them by commenting on this post, and we’ll build a larger list to take on!

Questions? Did you see ideas in this post that you’ve never heard of before? Contact me!

Comments?  Leave them below.